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ABSTRACT
Starting with heavy, immobile cameras and progressing
to immediately shareable, discreet cellphone videos, the last
century has expanded our ability to record ourselves and
others—whenever and wherever—to formerly unfathomable
heights. Black Mirror, a technology-based, sci-fi miniseries
now produced by digital entertainment giant, Netflix, tracks
this trajectory to its logical end in “The Entire History of
You.” In this not-so-distant, sci-fi future where Google Glass
is replaced by an “Augmented Reality Contact Lens and
Grain,” everything we see and hear is immediately recorded
and uploaded. Effectively, we no longer need memories to
recall the past.
But as with all new technologies, and indeed all Black
Mirror episodes, the Grain technology reveals an inherent
flaw in humans: when everything is recorded, humans
cannot relax in the comfort of hazy recollection or secret
memories. In the context of the legal system, both
government prosecutors and adverse civil parties will seek
discovery of everything one has seen and heard. This article
examines the constitutional and privacy issues raised by
Grain technology, which will undoubtedly be here soon.
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INTRODUCTION
“You know, half the organic memories you have are junk.”1
Black Mirror, which has been labeled “TV’s Magic 8-Ball”2
for its technological prescience, is a collection of self-contained
episodes that tackle plausible technological advances and the effect
those advances have on our world. While many episodes take place
in the United Kingdom, this article assumes that similar technology
exists contemporaneously in the United States and analyze various
episodes with an eye towards U.S. law.
In the show’s third episode, “The Entire History of You,”3
people in this alternate universe have almost uniformly been
implanted with a digital recording device known as a “grain”, which
allows them to review video and audio playback of every moment
they experience.4 Using a handheld remote, memories are shuffled
through like episodes on Netflix; they can be encrypted, deleted, or
1

Black Mirror: The Entire History of You (Channel 4 television broadcast
Dec. 18, 2011).
2
G. Clay Whittaker, ‘Black Mirror’ Is TV’s Magic 8-Ball, THE DAILY
BEAST (Sept. 14, 2015 1:05 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/black-mirror-istvs-magic-8-ball (“It becomes difficult to discuss the impact and predictions of
dystopian programs a few years after they’re created. At some point the
conversation has to switch from ‘will they be right’ to ‘are they right.’ In many
aspects Black Mirror was early in capturing certain aspects of life that have
become familiar to us since.”).
3
Black Mirror: The Entire History of You (Channel 4 television broadcast
Dec. 18, 2011).
4
The files are referred to as “grain recordings.”
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displayed on TV screens. Grains can also be stolen (a process known
as “gouging”), with the stored memories then sold to voyeuristic
“millionaire Chinese pervs.” Because the memory recordings in the
gouged grain would be lost, new buyers are given 30 years’ worth
of backup space to store memories (in the “cloud”).
Initially, we are introduced to Liam Foxwell, a young lawyer
interviewing with a law firm. On his way to the airport, Liam
reviews his recent interview performance through real time video
footage displayed on a retinal screen and stored in an implanted
“grain” behind his ear.5 At the airport, Liam consents to have his
memories screened by security agents to review the people Liam
came into contact with over the last 72 hours.6 Once home, Liam
uses his grain during arguments with his wife to settle disputes,
scrutinize body language, and uncover an affair.7
Given this ability to definitively resolve any dispute as to
who said what, what someone knew, or where someone was at any
given time, the implications of such technology are clear. Police,
insurance agencies, and aggrieved parties would assuredly seek
discovery of pertinent recordings, leading to issues regarding
privacy, government searches or seizures of an individual’s grain,
self-incrimination, and the production of evidence. Due in part to
the similarity between the grain’s functions and already-ubiquitous
cell phone technology, existing law is likely sufficient to address the
attendant constitutional and privacy rights of U.S. citizens with
grains.
I. INVASION OF PRIVACY
The first major issue implicated by grains is the right to
privacy. In this world where almost everyone is automatically
recording everything they do and see, anyone a person interacts with
(or views) is also being recorded by default. Harmlessly walking
down the street? Recorded on a grain. Checking into a hotel room
for an adulterous tryst? Recorded on a grain. Going on a drunken
rant? Recorded on a grain. Every moment that someone else is
5
6
7

Id.
Id.
Id.
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present, they are recording you and that memory is accessible,
reproducible, and displayable for anyone to see.
Unlike in the European Union, the “‘right to be forgotten,’ .
. . is not recognized in the United States.”8 Under federal law,
“[a]bsent some special circumstance (such as an attorney-client
privilege), no right of privacy or other protection attaches to words
spoken by one individual to another individual; the speaker assumes
the risk that his auditor may repeat the conversation to others.”9
Unfortunately for secretive individuals, there are no federal laws
that prohibit a second party from recording them as they go about
their business.
Looking to the future, the federal government is highly
unlikely to create any such laws. The right to record video or audio,
at least “in traditional public fora—streets, sidewalks, plazas, and
parks—is . . . necessarily included within the First Amendment’s
guarantee of speech and press rights as a corollary of the right to
disseminate the resulting recording.”10 Any attempt by the
government to establish content or non-content related restrictions
on recording, would be subject to either strict scrutiny11 or
intermediate scrutiny,12 respectively.
State law, however, often does provide a more robust right
to privacy. Several state constitutions explicitly create such a right.13
8

Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 745 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Case
C–131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos
(AEPD), ECLI:EU:C:2014:616 (May 13, 2014)).
9
United States v. Cox, 836 F. Supp. 1189, 1197 (D. Md. 1993).
10
Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 594–95 (7th
Cir. 2012).
11
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010)
(“Laws that burden political speech are ‘subject to strict scrutiny,’ which requires
the Government to prove that the restriction ‘furthers a compelling interest and is
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.’”) (quoting Wisconsin Right to Life,
Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007)).
12
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (for non-content
restrictions on speech, the government must show a sufficiently important or
substantial interest that is unrelated to suppression of free expression).
13
See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 (“The right of the people to privacy
is recognized and shall not be infringed. The legislature shall implement this
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The Restatement (Second) of Torts also concludes that “[o]ne who
invades the right of privacy of another is subject to liability for the
resulting harm to the interests of the other.”14 Three of the four
causes of action most commonly recognized by the Restatement
would very likely apply to grain recordings: (1) unreasonable
intrusion upon the seclusion of another;15 (2) unreasonable publicity
given to the other’s private life;16 and (3) publicity that unreasonably
places the other in a false light before the public.17 Subject to the
vagaries of state law, any post-recording publication of personal,
offensive, or misleading recordings could subject the recorder to
additional state law liability.
II. SEARCHES, SEIZURES, AND ARRESTS
The next issue arises in the contexts of grain searches and
section.”); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All people are by nature free and independent
and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and
liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and
obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.”); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (“Every
natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion
into the person’s private life except as otherwise provided herein. This section
shall not be construed to limit the public’s right of access to public records and
meetings as provided by law.”); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“No person shall be
disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.”).
14
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
15
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977)
(“One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or
seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the
other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person.”).
16
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (AM. LAW INST. 1977)
(“One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized
is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is
not of legitimate concern to the public.”).
17
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“One
who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the
public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy,
if (a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless
disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the
other would be placed.”).
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seizures. Given the vast amount of information potentially captured
by a grain, the government would surely seek control over grain
recordings in criminal prosecutions. If guilt or innocence could be
easily determined by viewing the alleged event unfold in real time,
gathering any other evidence would be unnecessary. The Fourth
Amendment, however, would still likely provide adequate
protections for a person’s grain rights.
The Fourth Amendment provides that the “right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated…”18 Thus, when “the Government obtains information by
physically intruding” on persons, houses, papers, or effects, “a
‘search’ within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment” has
occurred.19 “The Fourth Amendment is not concerned only with
trespassory intrusions on property[,]” but also “when the
government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society
recognizes as reasonable.”20
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has created a two-part
inquiry to examine if the government needs a search warrant before
searching or seizing a citizen’s property (here, a grain).21 First, the
individual must have “manifested a subjective expectation of
privacy in the object of the challenged search.”22 Second, society
must “[be] willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.”23
While the subjective inquiry is case specific, it is easy to deduce that
a person with a grain stored in his or her body, which contains every
conceivable piece of private data, would subjectively expect their
grain’s contents to be private. In regard to the objective inquiry, it
can be assumed that by virtue of an individual’s internal possession
and control over their own grain and historical privacy of one’s own
18

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 407 n.3 (2012).
20
Id. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001)).
21
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (citing Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
22
California, 476 U.S. at 211.
23
Id. (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 347).
19
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thoughts,24 society recognizes that person’s privacy expectation as
reasonable.25 In short, because of the internal placement of the grain
and the collective magnitude of the information stored on that grain,
the Fourth Amendment would require a search warrant for the
search or seizure of a grain absent exceptional circumstances.
While many exceptions, such as “exigent circumstances,”26
are highly fact intensive and cannot be addressed in the abstract, the
search incident to arrest (“SITA”) exception can be decided as a
matter of law. The Supreme Court “endorsed a general rule that
arresting officers, in order to prevent the arrestee from obtaining a
weapon or destroying evidence, could search both ‘the person
arrested’ and ‘the area within his immediate control.’”27 Later,, the
Court analyzed the SITA exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirement in the context of cellular phones. 28 The Court
held that the exception did not apply because it found that cell
phones “implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicated by
the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse” in that they
contain “a digital record of nearly every aspect of [peoples’] lives—
from the mundane to the intimate.”29 Although the Court noted the
possibility of data being remotely wiped to destroy any evidence, it
found that such tampering was not prevalent and the government
24

See generally Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
25
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that physical invasions of
the body by the state implicate privacy and liberty rights. See Cruzan by Cruzan
v. Dir. Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 342 (1990) (“The sanctity, and
individual privacy, of the human body is obviously fundamental to liberty. ‘Every
violation of a person’s bodily integrity is an invasion of his or her liberty.’”)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 237
(1990)).
26
See Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013) (“A variety of
circumstances may give rise to an exigency sufficient to justify a warrantless
search, including law enforcement’s need to provide emergency assistance to an
occupant of a home, engage in “hot pursuit” of a fleeing suspect, or enter a burning
building to put out a fire and investigate its cause.”) (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
27
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2175 (2016) (quoting
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at 763) (internal quotation marks omitted).
28
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
29
Id. at 2490 (citing Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010)).

41
14:1

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS

[VOL.

had more targeted ways to address that concern.30
Looking at grain technology, the Court would likely find
Riley instructive. Like cell phones, grains store an immense treasure
trove of personal and intimate information. Also, like cell phones,
information on grains cannot be used as a weapon that would
threaten an arresting officer’s life.31 While “The Entire History of
You,” did not address the possibility of remote wiping, we might
assume that other technological advances will allow police to take
control of a person’s grain remote, block incoming signals, or make
a copy of the data to preserve evidence. Simply put, grains, “[w]ith
all they contain and all they may reveal, [would] hold for many
Americans ‘the privacies of life.’”32 As such, whether incident to
arrest or as part of an investigation, the Fourth amendment would
likely protect grain recordings from search and seizure.
An important caveat is that like Liam’s interaction with the
airport security agent, an individual could consent to have his or her
grain recordings reviewed.33 Assuming that consent is not the result
of government coercion or police gamesmanship, it would waive
any Fourth Amendment or Fifth Amendment self-incrimination
claims by a defendant.34
III. COMPELLING PRODUCTION BY DEFENDANT
Once a person is arrested and a search warrant is obtained,
the next question is whether the police could force the person to turn
over his or her grain recordings. The Self-Incrimination Clause of
the Fifth Amendment provides that no “person . . . shall be

30

Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2486–87.
Id. at 2485 (“Digital data stored on a cell phone cannot itself be used as
a weapon to harm an arresting officer or to effectuate the arrestee’s escape.”).
32
Id. at 2494–95 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630
(1886)). Although this quote speaks about cell phones, the same could apply to
grains.
33
See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (holding that “[t]he Fourth
Amendment test for a valid consent to search is that the consent be voluntary”).
34
See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 221 (1973).
31
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compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”35
This “privilege protects an accused only from being compelled to
testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence
of a testimonial or communicative nature.”36 To be considered
“testimonial,” the information sought itself must explicitly or
implicitly relate to “a factual assertion or disclose information” to
be considered “compelled” testimony.37 The Fifth Amendment’s
right against self-incrimination ultimately “respects a private inner
sanctum of individual feeling and thought and proscribes state
intrusion to extract self-condemnation.”38
Less clear, however, is the status of the law with regard to
production of physical items that tend to incriminate a person. The
Supreme Court held that “a compulsory production of the private
books and papers of the owner . . . is compelling him to be a witness
against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment[.]”39
But the Supreme Court has also “long held that the privilege does
not protect a suspect from being compelled by the State to produce
‘real or physical evidence.’”40 The distinction, it seems, turns on
whether the personal effects (or body part) are testimonial in nature,
or whether the defendant was compelled by the state to create the
material.41
The Court in Fisher v. United States, however, held that “the
Fifth Amendment would not be violated by the [compelled
production of] papers [which] on their face might incriminate the
[defendant].”42 The Court recognized that the act of producing the
documents may be testimonial to the extent that the act of production
concedes “the existence of the papers demanded and their
35

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966).
37
Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988).
38
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973).
39
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35 (1886).
40
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 589 (1990) (quoting Schmerber,
384 U.S. at 764).
41
See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 472–73 (1976) (upholding the
introduction of seized business papers because “[t]he records seized contained
statements that petitioner had voluntarily committed to writing”).
42
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976).
36
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possession or control by the taxpayer,” or because the production
serves to authenticate the materials.43 Accordingly, multiple courts
of appeals’ physical evidence self-incrimination analysis now
focuses on whether demanding the information compels its creation
and, if not, “whether the act of producing it would constitute
compelled testimonial communication.”44
Here, a grain is definitely in possession of the defendant,
located within his or her body, and contains recordings of what the
defendant said and observed. Although the recording, and any
statements made in the recordings, would be considered voluntary
(at the time of their creation), the production of those recordings
would not be voluntary. In the most literal sense, a defendant
compelled to produce the grain recordings of what they said would
be forced “‘to disclose the contents of his own mind’ that implicates
the Self–Incrimination Clause.”45
A much closer call occurs in the context of arguably nontestimonial grain recordings, such as video of a crime scene or the
dimensions of an instrument. Like producing a shirt for the jury’s
consideration,46 the “evidence” contained in the grain’s videos could
be viewed as real or physical evidence. In those cases, the Court
would still find that the defendant is not required to produce his or
her grain recordings because it would constitute compelling of
personal testimony (in the form of what was seen). It also does not
fall neatly into the categorical exception for real or physical
evidence47 because it directly implicates the defendant’s control or
knowledge of evidence. In that way, it is so connected with the
defendant’s personal thoughts and actions as to implicate the self43

Id. at 409–10.
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct. 29, 1992, 1 F.3d
87, 93 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984);
Andresen, 427 U.S. at 473; Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409–10).
45
Doe, 487 U.S. at 211 (quoting Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128
(1957)).
46
See Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252–53 (1910) (compelling
production of a shirt).
47
See, e.g., Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409.
44
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incrimination concerns inherent in the Fifth Amendment’s
protection.
IV. COMPELLING PRODUCTION BY A THIRD PARTY
But what about compelling the production of third parties’
grain recordings? Could the police force a witness to a crime to turn
over their internal video feed? The answer is very likely, yes.48 The
Supreme Court has made clear “that the Fifth Amendment privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination, being personal to the
defendant, does not extend to the testimony or statements of third
parties called as witnesses at trial.”49 Police informants or
undercover agents will likely have no problem producing their grain
recordings, even those containing the surreptitiously-recorded
admissions of a defendant, without violating the Fourth or Fifth
Amendment.50
Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c)(1), the state
may use a subpoena to “order the witness to produce any books,
papers, documents, data, or other objects the subpoena designates.”
51
In order for a witness to quash such a subpoena, they would have
to show:
(1) that the documents are evidentiary and
relevant; (2) that they are not otherwise procurable
reasonably in advance of trial by exercise of due
diligence; (3) that the party cannot properly prepare
for trial without such production and inspection in
advance of trial and that the failure to obtain such
inspection may tend unreasonably to delay the trial;
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973) (“The Constitution
explicitly prohibits compelling an accused to bear witness ‘against himself’: it
necessarily does not proscribe incriminating statements elicited from another.”).
49
United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 234 (1975).
50
See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971); Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (“[T]his Court nor any member has ever
expressed the view that the Fourth Amendment protects a wrongdoer’s misplaced
belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not
reveal it.”).
51
Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c)(1).
48
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and (4) that the application is made in good faith and
is not intended as a general ‘fishing expedition.’52
Absent such a showing, a third-party witness’s grain
recordings would have to be turned over to the state upon
subpoena.53
Although not specifically addressed in this Black Mirror
episode, it is foreseeable that a grain might both store recordings
locally and back up those recordings online in the cloud. If the
recordings are stored on a remote server, the state would still be able
to access to them through the Stored Communications Act.54 Under
18 U.S.C. § 2703(c), the state could obtain any content or noncontent information contained within a server by obtaining a search
warrant.55 Absent a privilege or a failure to comply with applicable
52

United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 699–700 (1974).
Other statutes also provide an avenue for disclosure in certain types of
criminal investigation. Under 21 U.S.C. § 876(a) (date of code edition cited), for
example, the Attorney General has the authority to “require the production of any
records (including books, papers, documents, and other tangible things which
constitute or contain evidence) which the Attorney General finds relevant or
material to the investigation” of a violation of the Controlled Substances Act.
54
18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (date of code edition cited) (“Records concerning
electronic communication service or remote computing service.--(1) A
governmental entity may require a provider of electronic communication service
or remote computing service to disclose a record or other information pertaining
to a subscriber to or customer of such service (not including the contents of
communications) only when the governmental entity—
(A) obtains a warrant issued using the procedures described in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a State court, issued
using State warrant procedures) by a court of competent jurisdiction;
(B) obtains a court order for such disclosure under subsection (d) of this
section;
(C) has the consent of the subscriber or customer to such disclosure;
(D) submits a formal written request relevant to a law enforcement
investigation concerning telemarketing fraud for the name, address, and place
of business of a subscriber or customer of such provider, which subscriber or
customer is engaged in telemarketing (as such term is defined in section 2325
of this title); or
(E) seeks information under paragraph (2).”).
55
Under 18 U.S.C. 2510(8), “‘contents’, when used with respect to any wire,
oral, or electronic communication, includes any information concerning the
53
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law, the government would very likely be able to compel third
parties—whether witnesses to the crime or holders of the
information—to produce copies of grain recordings.
V. COMPELLING PRODUCTION BY THE GOVERNMENT
Analogous to police body cams, defendants would also prize
access to the arresting officers’ grain recordings in order to establish
malfeasance or refute the government’s theory of the case. But how
much of the grain footage should be produced? Do the officers’ have
an individual right to privacy that could protect certain recordings?
While state laws vary on the subject, federal officers’ grain
recordings would likely be obtainable with few exemptions.
Like tort claims for invasion of privacy, state statutes
provide the most likely basis for requesting grain productions. As
such, the states are relatively unburdened when it comes to
legislating who can and cannot have access to police recordings.56
While many states have public records request statutes,57 some
states specifically exempt body camera videos from disclosure
under certain statutes58 or limit requests to certain individuals.59
Generally speaking, these exemptions from disclosure are not
complete bars, but instead ban production of videos taken within
traditionally private areas such as private residences, mental health
facilities, or other places where citizens have a reasonable
expectation of privacy.60 With few exceptions, the person being
recorded by a body camera is authorized to obtain those
substance, purport, or meaning of that communication[.]”
56
Adam Marshall, Police Bodycam Videos: The Wild West of Open
Records Requests, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (Feb. 21,
2018), https://www.rcfp.org/bodycam-video-access.
57
See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6250 et seq. (1998); WASH. REV. CODE
42.56.010 et seq (2017).
58
See S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1-240(G)(1) (2015) (“Data recorded by a
body-worn camera is not a public record subject to disclosure under the Freedom
of Information Act.”).
59
See S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1-240(G)(5) (2015) (listing individuals “who
may request and must receive data recorded by a body-worn camera”).
60
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 119.071(l)(2) (2018).
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recordings.61
Under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”),62 citizens
may request the full or partial disclosure of previously unreleased
information and documents controlled by the United States
government. Like body cameras, federal employees’ grain
recordings would be subject to release under this statute as a
document controlled by the government. Section 552(b)(7) of the
FOIA outlines certain exemptions for disclosures, including
material that “could reasonably be expected to constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” which weighs “the
privacy interests that would be compromised by disclosure against
the public interest in release of the requested information.”63 So,
although individuals are authorized to request all documents or
videos pertaining to them,64 other individuals’ privacy rights―even
those of federal law enforcement officers―may be invoked to
defeat a records request.65
Ultimately, the current law regarding government
disclosures of information is sufficiently broad―and the grain
technology is sufficiently similar to body cameras―that little would
need to be changed with the advent of grain recordings. Individuals
recorded by police would still have access to those recordings in
criminal and most civil cases. Any exemptions to grain disclosures
would likely align with current exemptions, which focus on the
government’s interest in preventing ongoing crime or protecting
third parties’ individual privacy rights.
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See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 119.071(l)(4)(a) (2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1240(G)(5)(a) (2015).
62
5 U.S.C. § 552 (Year of edition of statute).
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Davis v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 968 F.2d 1276, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(1) (Year of edition of statute).
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See Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 1106, 1115–16 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (affirming exemption of “names, addresses, telephone numbers, social
security numbers, and other such private information regarding law enforcement
officials, a ‘judicial protectee,’ other government employees, unnamed ‘thirdparty individuals,’ and [a third party]”).
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CONCLUSION
Grain recordings, which would show accurate depictions of
an individual’s visual and auditory perceptions, would be invaluable
evidence for private litigants, criminal defendants, and the
government. As with any technology that makes it easier to attain
the truth of a matter but implicates a privacy right, grain recordings
would be very likely protected under the Fourth and Fifth
Amendment. Additionally, while production of grain recordings
would likely be routine in civil matters, criminal defendants would
still have adequate protections against self-incrimination to limit the
government’s ability to obtain those recordings.

